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In principle, default inheritance has always been the underlying logic of grammar, and 
of morphology in particular. Without inheritance there can be no generalisation; and 
without default inheritance, there can be no exceptions. Arguably, the study of 
morphology is the intellectual endeavour where this logic has been tried and tested 
most successfully in dealing with a miriad of detail which is hard to match in any 
other intellectual endeavour. Not surprisingly, some version of default inheritance 
(aka normal inheritance) has been widely used not only in constraint-based theories of 
grammar, but also in AI more generally, where it has been used in modeling human 
inference. 
 The basic idea behind default inheritance is very simple and obvious: more 
specific patterns override or block more general ones; or where there is a conflict 
between a rule and an exception, the exception always wins. However, this simple 
principle raises such profound challenges for any formalised theory that some people 
reject the whole idea. Indeed, default inheritance challenges elementary traditional 
logic in just the same way that the modern view of categories as prototypes challenges 
the classical view of categories as fixed classes defined by necessary and sufficient 
conditions. (So far as I know, I’m the only person to point out the link between 
prototypes and default inheritance; but any theory of categorisation that allows default 
inheritance automatically allows categories to generate ‘prototype effects’.) In short, 
integrating default inheritance into any theoretical package is not a trivial task. 
 The potential problems with default inheritance are as follows: 
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of (say) 
morphology? 
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic 
logic?  
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which 
of them should take priority? 
• economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby 
losing the benefits of generalisation? 
• relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited? 
Any theory that incorporates default inheritance must confront these questions, and 
the more explicitly formalised the theory, the more urgent they become. The 
discussion will present the solutions offered by Word Grammar, and will explain how 
these solutions are related to the other components of Word Grammar theory. It will 
not try to explore how, or whether, the Word-Grammar solutions can be applied to 
other theoretical packages. 
The WG theory of morphology (and other things) 
First, though, I will outline the theory of morphology contained in Word Grammar 
(WG). Like all the other theories represented in this workshop, and in Stump’s 
terminology, WG probably qualifies as an ‘inferential-realizational’ theory in the 
European Word-and-Paradigm tradition, with ‘realization’ linking lexical and 
syntactic categories to the forms of the words concerned. For example, the word 
defined by combining the lexical item DOG with the inflectional category ‘plural’ 
(DOG, plural) is realized by the form dogs. Moreover, generalisations apply by 
default inheritance (rather than by unification). However, WG morphology also has 
some distinctive characteristics: 
• Syntactic categories and lexical items are word-classes in a taxonomy rather 
than features consisting of an attribute and its value; e.g. ‘plural’ and DOG are 
both word-classes, with the same theoretical status. Features are allowed in 
WG, but are only used for expressing agreement. 
• Morphology is recognised as a distinct level between syntax and phonology; 
e.g. {dog} and {s} are classified as root and suffix, and the {s} of dogs is the 
same morph as the one in barks, and is a different concept from the phoneme 
/s/. 
• Inflectional and derivational morphology share the same realisational 
apparatus, as do clitics, and differ only in whether the ‘output’ is a different 
lexical item. 
• Words are related not only to their stem, but also to ‘derived’ versions of the 
stem called ‘x-variants’ (where ‘x’ varies); e.g. {{dog}{s}} is the s-variant of 
DOG, plural. In cases of syncretism, two distinct words share the same variant 
of their base; e.g. the past participle and passive participle in English are both 
realized by their ‘en-variants’. 
• The ‘attributes’ of other theories are expressed as network relations which are 
themselves interrelated in a taxonomy; for example, the relation ‘en-variant’ 
‘isa’ (is a particular case of) the more general relation ‘ed-variant’, which in 
turn isa realization. 
 
These distinctive characteristics of the WG theory of morphology all derive from 
one very general characteristic of WG: its cognitive orientation. WG isn’t just a 
theory of morphology, or even of language; it is a theory of language located in a 
general framework of ideas about cognition. According to WG, language is an 
ordinary part of cognition rather than a mental module (as in Chomskyan theory). The 
modularity debate is largely irrelevant for most of the other theories in the workshop, 
which are cognitively agnostic, but it is crucial for WG because the goal is a model of 
cognitive structure. This cognitive orientation is one of the (many) reasons for 
choosing a logic based on default inheritance, given that this is so clearly the logic 
that we use in everyday thinking about other things. 
Morphology is a particularly good area of language to face the challenge of 
describing language in domain-general terms because it is the area where language is 
most remote from the rest of cognition – from both meaning and phonetics.  If even 
morphology can be modeled as an example of general cognition, without any special 
apparatus unique to morphology, then surely language is not a special module of the 
mind.  
Default inheritance in morphology 
As mentioned earlier, morphology is also a particularly good area for testing any 
theory of default inheritance because we have so much relevant data – indeed, our 
ancestors have probably been assembling such data for at least 4,000 years (since 
Babylonian scribes first wrote down verb paradigms). Every generalisation applies by 
inheritance, and every exception overrides the default. Moreover, the data of 
morphology are (in general) both clear and highly structured. For instance, there is no 
uncertainty about dogs being the plural of DOG, and it is clear that the relation of 
dogs to DOG is exactly the same as that of cats to CAT. Moreover, these facts are 
relatively context-independent, so morphology is a good area for building self-
contained models for an area of human knowledge, as witness the proliferation of 
computer models for morphology. 
 Morphology faces all the general challenges for default inheritance listed 
above: 
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of morphology? 
If the logic is part of general cognition, it must not depend on analyses or 
notations peculiar to morphosyntax (such as attribute-value matrices). 
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic 
logic? If exceptions are always possible, how can we be sure that the general 
rule for some morphological class applies in any particular case?  
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which 
of them should take priority? This problem becomes especially critical if 
attribute-value matrices are replaced by some more general format. But in 
particular, 
o how are conflicts in multiple inheritance handled? In morphology, 
words normally inherit different properties from a lexical item and 
from various morphosyntactic categories, and normally the system is 
organised to avoid conflicts, but what if they do conflict? 
o if an exceptional form overrides a form defined indirectly, are the 
indirect relations inherited? In morphology, the problem is common 
with ‘reentrancy’ (Bouma 2006): what if the default realization of 
some property p is the same as the base, but some exceptional lexeme 
realises p as (say) bac – does that mean that the base also changes to 
bac?  
• economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby 
losing the benefits of generalisation? In morphology, how do we stop inherited 
forms from being stored so that every form is simply retrieved rather than 
created anew? (The problem is that we know from psycholinguistic 
experiments that some forms are in fact created anew.) 
• relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited? Any 
word or form has a host of properties that could be inherited, but which are 
currently irrelevant – e.g. we know that a typical English word is spoken in the 
UK, the USA, Australia and so on, and for some words we know their 
etymology; but both of these properties are irrelevant in most contexts (though 
they are both potentially crucial in certain imaginable situations). It seems 
reasonable to assume that we don’t, in fact, inherit such properties, but how 
does the inheritance mechanism filter them out?  
The Word-Grammar solution 
The WG solution to these problems rests on three assumptions fundamental to WG 
theory: 
1. Types and tokens are different. Every bit of ongoing experience is a ‘token’ 
(though this term tends to be used by linguists rather than psychologists), 
which we understand by categorizing it as an example of some stored ‘type’. 
And every token is represented by a separate concept (i.e. by a separate node 
in the cognitive structure). In theorizing about cognitive structures we can 
distinguish newly-created tokens from stored types (though learning turns 
some tokens into permanent types). Rather obviously, but importantly for the 
WG theory, if a token is an example of a type, then it will always be lower in 
the inheritance hierarchy than that type – and, indeed, lower than any other 
concept from which it might inherit. 
2. Every conceptual node (i.e. every concept) has an activation level. The level 
depends partly on frequency and recency of previous activation 
(‘entrenchment’), but partly too on current mental activity, which is 
determined by attention and the ensuing spreading activation. In general, the 
currently available activation is concentrated on ‘relevant’ nodes and their 
neighbours. 
3. The overall conceptual structure is a ‘taxonomic network’ in which every link 
is directed. Thanks to ‘isa’ links, every node (including token nodes) is part of 
a taxonomy, but any node may be linked freely to any other node (in contrast 
with a ‘directed acyclic graph’, in which loops are not possible). The overall 
taxonomy includes relational concepts as well as entity concepts, so every 
labelled link (e.g. ‘base’, ‘x-variant’) is part of a taxonomy of relations. 
4. Some relational concepts are marked as mutually incompatible (e.g. ‘before’, 
‘after’). 
 
Given these assumptions, then, the WG algorithm for default inheritance (DI) is as 
follows:  
1. Every token inherits, but it’s only tokens that inherit; so inheritance exists just 
to enrich newly created nodes. Assume a newly created token node Token, 
which isa one or more type nodes, each labelled Typei. 
2. Search each Typei for inheritable properties – i.e. for links from Typei to other 
concepts, consisting of a relation R and an entity E. These are inheritable if  
a. they are sufficiently relevant to be active (beyond a certain threshold 
level). 
b. the relation R does not already apply to Token, where R already 
applies to Token if Token already has a link via a concept which either 
isa R, or which is incompatible with R. 
3. For each inheritable property, make a copy ‘Token – R’ – E’(with R’ isa R and 
E’ isa E, and the same directionality as in the original). If the properties of 
Typei form a loop back to Typei, make a copy of the entire loop so that each 
type node only has one copy token. Notice that R’ and E’ are tokens, so DI 
immediately applies to them as well, subject to available activation.  
4. Repeat 2-3 for every node above each Typei  in the taxonomy. 
 
This theory solves the problems for DI as follows: 
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of morphology? 
The DI algorithm is completely domain-general, and could be applied as easily 
to knowledge of birds as to our knowledge of morphology. 
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic 
logic? Every inference is reliable, so the system is actually monotonic, 
because DI always applies ‘bottom-up’, applying only to the most specific 
possible concepts, newly-created tokens. 
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which 
of them should take priority?  
o how are conflicts in multiple inheritance handled? This problem is 
deliberately left unsolved in WG theory, because it is unsolved in real 
cognition. The ‘Nixon Diamond’ was a genuine conflict, and was only 
‘solved’ by stipulating a winner. There are cases in morphology where 
unresolved conflicts have no resolution and leave us without any 
outcome; arguably, the gap where we expect amn’t or aren’t is an 
example. 
o if an exceptional form overrides a form defined indirectly, are the 
indirect relations inherited? Again this conflict has no general solution 
in cognition, so it needs no general solution in theory. Instead, WG 
allows solutions to be stipulated by isa links between exceptional and 
default values to show that indirect relations are inherited; without 
such isa links, these relations are not inherited.  
• economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby 
losing the benefits of generalisation? This storage is prevented by allowing DI 
only for tokens; so the inherited properties will only be stored if the token 
itself is stored (i.e. remembered and learned). 
• relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited? 
Relevance controls DI through activation. E.g. if etymology happens to be the 
current focus of attention, then tokens may inherit known etymologies, but not 
otherwise. 
 
